THE EUROPEAN UNION “GRAND STRATEGY”: BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to analyze the process of forming, adjusting and implementing the European Union “grand strategy”. These trends are being implemented in the context of rapid transformation of international relations. The research methodology is based on the specific historical analysis of the current stage of European integration, problem-chronological, structural-functional, comparative methods. The scientific novelty of the article is due to the approach to considering the existing contradictions between the needs of accepting new member states of the European Union and security risks for Europe, which arose as a result of the collapse of the post-bipolar security system. This creates new opportunities and risks. The conclusions note that the formation of the “grand strategy” should take place on an institutional basis. This basis is “eroded” by the dual model of national and transnational politics in the European Union. As a result, the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament are called upon to be institutional initiators of the formation of the “grand strategy”. Adjustments to the “grand strategy” are inspired by the national governments of the European Union member states and are carried out in the EU institutions through the mechanisms of ministerial meetings. In an ideal model, the implementation of the “grand strategy” of the European Union should be a consolidated result of the functioning of the national and supranational levels of EU policy. In real politics, at the stages of formation, adjustment and implementation, the “grand strategy” faces specific problems. These difficulties manifest themselves in both the EU common foreign policy and the EU common defense policy.